



Visegrad development aid in the Eastern Partnership region¹

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The European Union launched its Eastern Partnership (EaP) program in 2009, bringing together the member states of the Union and the six countries of its Eastern neighborhood (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) under a common initiative with the aim of contributing to their democratization and bringing them closer to the European Union politically, economically, and at the society level. More than four years later, after the 3rd meeting of the Presidents and Prime Ministers of the group (held under the Lithuanian EU Presidency in November 2013), and after Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych refused to deepen his countries relations with the EU by signing an Association Agreement, hopes have significantly dropped and the program faces serious challenges.²

While Vilnius is an important milestone, the EaP program does not end there. Accordingly, the necessity of the EU's continued support and commitment is echoed in the V4 and EaP countries' common declaration of May 17, 2013.³ While the EU's support as such is certainly important, the V4 countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), who were among the initiators and midwives of the program several years ago, also need to move beyond political declarations, and consider how they can further improve their contributions to the region's reforms if they are to hope for tangible results. One of the most important tools for enhancing the reform processes and for bringing the Eastern partners closer to the European Union is through the assistance provided as part of the countries' international development cooperation (IDC) policy, through which all four Visegrad countries are active in the region. It has often been mentioned that to pursue their interest in the region, the V4 countries should coordinate their IDC policies, invest more resources, and possibly even create a common

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² Reforms conducted in the earlier EaP "frontrunner," Ukraine, have been stagnating since 2010, and the government has yet to deliver on several specific requirements in order to be able to sign the Association Agreement (AA), including the Agreement on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The recent "star-reformer," Moldova, sank into a political crisis in the spring of 2013, which risked slowing down the association process between the country and the EU. By now, it is clear that the country cannot sign but can only initial the AA, along with Georgia and Armenia. At the same time, not much progress can be seen in Azerbaijan or Belarus, the two states remaining under authoritarian rule.

³ "Joint statement on the Eastern Partnership of the foreign ministers of the Visegrad Group, Ireland and Lithuania." visegradgroup.eu, 2013. Available on: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2013/joint-statement-on-the> (accessed on September 18, 2015).

development fund for such purposes.⁴ Building on an analysis of primary sources (official strategy papers and reports of V4 countries) as well as on interviews with representatives of national governments and the International Visegrad Fund, the present paper seeks to explore the possibilities of such cooperation, and gives concrete recommendations to this end.

Visegrad IDC policies towards the EaP countries

The Visegrad countries are often referred to as emerging or re-emerging donors due to the fact that their international development cooperation policies were only (re-)launched long after their regime changes, in the early 2000s.⁵ As they entered the international donor community, they sought to capitalize on their unique and specific knowledge concerning political, economic, and social transformation and transition. This body of knowledge – the so-called transition experience – naturally gravitated towards countries that were going through or had just embarked on a similar systemic transformation: the countries of Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.

With the launch of the Eastern Partnership, those possessing such knowledge gained additional importance. Although the differences between the disbursements of V4 countries were and remain significant, in absolute terms all V4 countries have increased their contributions in EaP countries as compared to the pre-crisis years of 2007–2008. The data in Annex II shows that the EaP region has become more important in the bilateral development policies of individual Visegrad countries: looking at the proportion of the countries' bilateral ODA spent in the EaP region (as a percentage of their total bilateral ODA), we find that in all four cases the shares have increased since the pre-crisis years.

Moving beyond the disbursements, the development policies of Visegrad countries toward the region show different patterns as well, rooted in the differing policies of the individual international development cooperation of each. Among the V4, the *Czech Republic* set up a completely unique IDC system in 2007, by institutionalizing the distinction between classic issues of development cooperation policy and transition policy. The country's classic development policy selected Moldova as a program country and Georgia as a project country⁶ from among the six EaP partners, while its Transition Promotion Program involves Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.⁷ A cooperation program was signed between Chisinau and Prague in 2011, which laid out a detailed strategy for the 2010–2017 period, and defined priority areas including environmental protection, social development (education, social and health services), agriculture, water supply and sanitation, governance, and civil society

⁴ E.g.: M. Gniazdowski, "Visegrad cooperation in Polish foreign policy: as it stands and the outlook for the future," in R. Ondrejcsák, eds, *Panorama of global security environment 2010*, Bratislava: CENAA, 2010, pp. 55–7; D. Kačan, "East of center: can the Visegrad Group speak with one voice on Eastern policy?," *PISM Policy Paper* 53, 2013. Available online: <http://www.pism.pl/Publications/PISM-Policy-Paper-no-53> (accessed on August 31, 2014).

⁵ For more on this see: S. Lightfoot, I. Lindenhovius Zubizarreta, "The emergence of international development policies in Central and Eastern European states," in P. Hoebink ed., *European development cooperation. In between the local and the global*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010, pp. 175–93.

⁶ "The development cooperation strategy of the Czech Republic 2010–2017," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2010. p. 15. Available online: http://www.mzv.cz/file/762314/FINAL__Development_Cooperation_Strategy_2010_2017.pdf (accessed on September 18, 2015).

⁷ "Target Countries," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. Available online: <http://www.mzv.cz> (accessed on August 31, 2013).

development.⁸ Its implementation is in the hands of the Czech Development Agency, which manages technical cooperation projects selected through public procurement and grant calls. Additional modalities, as defined in the Development Cooperation Strategy, are scholarships and small-scale projects which are better aimed at the society of the target country, either because they involve citizens in the former case, or because they target specific local needs in the latter.⁹

The Transition Promotion Program is also aimed at the society directly. The main areas of the program are support for civil society, youth, media, and defenders of human rights, as well as cooperation with local authorities. Here, all EaP countries are eligible for project support, and – according to the last available report from 2010 – all EaP countries benefited from the program to various extents, with the exception of Azerbaijan and Armenia.¹⁰

Hungary's IDC policy is the least developed among V4 countries. As of May 2013, there was still no overarching legislation or strategy guiding the policy. The Hungarian IDC system is centered on the MFA, works without a development agency, and currently does not include any re-granting organization. In its 1/2003 decision, the IDC Inter-Ministerial Committee named Moldova and Ukraine as priority countries of the Hungarian development policy.¹¹ Officially this selection has not changed ever since, and the other four EaP countries have hardly appeared on the spectrum of Hungary's IDC policy. According to a publication of its MFA from 2008, Moldova became a program country with a cooperation program for 2009–2011.¹² In the same document from 2008, Ukraine is listed as a project country. This is somewhat controversial, since Ukraine has always been the biggest beneficiary of Hungarian bilateral ODA in the EaP region. Moldova is in a distant second place, and in absolute amounts was a bit (but not significantly) ahead of the other EaP partners until 2011, when both Georgia and Belarus both surpassed it.

Based on its 2009 and 2010 reports, Hungary placed emphasis on sharing its transition experience with its partners, mainly with Moldova and Ukraine.¹³ With regard to Moldova, these reports list a couple of technical assistance projects providing support in the adoption of the EU's *acquis communautaire*. Such projects still continue in the fields of agriculture and, more recently, energy. Additionally, the Ministry provides project support for NGOs, albeit on a rather irregular basis. In Ukraine, the priority is cooperation with organizations and local authorities in certain cities of the Transcarpathian region, which is inhabited by a significant Hungarian minority. An important amount of the ODA directed to Hungarian communities living in Ukraine focuses mainly on the development of education and health care, e.g.

⁸ "Development cooperation programme: Moldova 2011–2017," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2011. Available online: http://www.mzv.cz/file/698495/Development_Cooperation_Programme_Moldova_2011_2017.pdf (accessed on September 18, 2015).

⁹ Unfortunately, no data is available on the number of scholarship recipients broken down by country of origin.

¹⁰ The most support was provided for Belarus (321,052 euros), then Georgia (273,060 euros), Moldova (247,118 euros) and finally Ukraine (159,656 euros). See "Projects Implemented in 2010," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2010.

¹¹ "International Development Cooperation Inter-Ministerial Committee. 1/2003. Decision,," IDC IMC, 2003.

¹² "Hungary: inspired by experience: Hungarian development cooperation," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, 2008, p. 20. Available online: <http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/09524B2E-76D7-4DCC-ADF6-67D3E1A14FA7/0/InspiredByExperience.pdf> (accessed on September 18, 2015).

¹³ The annual reports for 2011 and 2012 are not yet available on the government website as of May 2013.

through the so-called Szülőföld Alap (Homeland Fund),¹⁴ which has now been replaced by the Bethlen Gábor Fund.

Poland's international development cooperation policy underwent a major reform in 2011, and got a new impetus under the new Act on Development Cooperation and the 2012–2015 Multiannual Development Cooperation Program, although it continues to work without a development agency. The policy area is managed by the Department of Development Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which deals both with the strategic tasks of policy planning and programming, and the managerial tasks of project selection and supervising implementation.¹⁵ The new strategic document highlights the Eastern Partnership region as a whole, as a geographic priority.¹⁶

Unlike other partner countries, in Belarus no development aid is provided to the central administration. It is rather invested in the development and empowerment of the civil society, and in supporting media outlets. With respect to the absolute amount of aid, Belarus is followed by Ukraine and Georgia, while the contribution in Moldova is significantly lower than in these latter two. In terms of modalities, technical assistance to governmental bodies (except in Belarus), scholarships, and direct project support should be mentioned. According to the Annual Reports of Poland's Development Cooperation between 2009 and 2011, Poland supports the partners' European aspirations in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia through providing aid to administrations, and to governmental bodies generally in the form of technical assistance, through sharing Poland's transition experience, and by helping with the adoption of the EU's *acquis communautaire*. Additionally, Poland offers support for scholarships, which are most popular among Belarusians and Ukrainians.¹⁷

Since 2011, project support has been provided in all EaP countries through calls for projects run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 2012, the International Solidarity Fund (ISF),¹⁸ a re-granting organization, has also been involved in Polish development cooperation activities in Eastern Europe. It is in charge of supporting democratization and the transition process in those partner countries of Poland that qualify as "partly free" or "not free" under the categorization of Freedom House. Through open calls for proposals, it distributes grants to Polish non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who in partnership with civil society organizations in the partner countries implement short term projects. This program covers Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Azerbaijan and Armenia were target countries neither in 2012 nor in 2013, which is remarkable since neither country performs better than those selected as targets.¹⁹

Slovakia is by far the smallest Visegrad donor in the EaP region. The 2009–2013 strategic framework of development cooperation is the second mid-term IDC strategy of the Slovak

¹⁴ "Report about the activities of the official Hungarian international development cooperation and humanitarian aid in 2010," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, 2011. p. 42.

¹⁵ Interview with Polish MFA officials, May 2013.

¹⁶ "Poland's development cooperation annual report 2010," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 2011, p. 12.

¹⁷ "Poland's development co-Operation annual report 2009," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 2010, p. 54.

¹⁸ The development cooperation act refers to the International Solidarity Fund as the Polish Foundation for International Development Cooperation "Know How." The legal basis of the two organizations is the same. The ISF took over the registration of the latter and was (re-)launched in 2012.

¹⁹ In all, 2.57 million US dollars was available for Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Tajikistan and Tunisia in 2013.

Republic, and is valid for the period of 2009–2013. This strategy defines priority countries, dividing them into program and project countries. Reflecting Slovakia's stronger focus on the Western Balkans as opposed to Eastern Europe, none of the six Eastern partners were selected as a program country – although admittedly, funds directed to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have increased since the start of the EaP initiative.²⁰ Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are project countries, where the development activity of Slovakia is implemented through the Slovak Development Agency. Bratislava seeks mostly to contribute to the building of democratic institutions, civil society, market economy, and infrastructure, and to the social development of partners²¹ through the sharing of Slovakia's transition experience. The element of experience transfer was strengthened by the establishment of the Center for Experience Transfer from Integration and Reforms (CETIR), which was set up in 2011 with the aim of "intensifying contacts of Slovak experts with representatives of state authorities in countries of the Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership or other transition countries."²² While it does not exclude civil society organizations from the circle of beneficiaries, it first and foremost targets public administration, supporting bilateral cooperation with the actors of Slovakia's governmental administration.²³ In this regard, therefore, CETIR differs both from the International Solidarity Fund of Poland and the Czech Transition Promotion Program.

Apart from bilateral activities, Visegrad countries have also started to support EaP countries through a common channel, the *International Visegrad Fund* (IVF). The Fund was established in 2001 in order to deepen the internal cohesion of the Visegrad Group by providing an opportunity for V4 civil society organizations to work together on projects of common interest. Ten years later, the idea of institutionalizing a framework for common IVF activities in the EU's Eastern neighborhood arose, based on the success of the Fund's work and the Visegrad countries' common foreign policy objectives in Eastern Europe: in 2011, the governments of the four countries established the Visegrad 4 Eastern Partnership (V4EaP) program designed specifically for the region. The program was launched the following year²⁴ with a budget of 1,456,800 euros, receiving an additional sum of approximately 1.5 million from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. This amount is divided between grant programs available to consortiums of NGOs from Visegrad and EaP countries, and scholarships for students from EaP countries in order to pursue studies in a Visegrad country of their choice. The real added value of the grant and scholarship programs is their socialization effect on the participants, which is central to achieving deep-reaching and sustainable changes within the targeted societies.

While it is too early to judge the success of the IVF V4EaP program *per se*, certain characteristics, both positive and negative, have already become evident when we evaluate it from the perspective of individual V4 countries. On the upside, the IVF program appears as an additional tool in the implementation of the common foreign policy objectives of the

²⁰ Serbia in the Western Balkans is a program country. "Medium-term strategy for official development assistance of the Slovak Republic for the years 2009–2013," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, December 13, 2009, p. 13. Available online: [http://www.mzv.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_844BDE60BA6C7E25C1257C86004A2955_EN/\\$File/Strednodoba%20strategia%20ODA%20SR%202014-2018_UK_11_02_2014.pdf](http://www.mzv.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_844BDE60BA6C7E25C1257C86004A2955_EN/$File/Strednodoba%20strategia%20ODA%20SR%202014-2018_UK_11_02_2014.pdf) (accessed on September 18, 2015).

²¹ The list is based on focus areas posted on the website of Slovak Aid (www.slovakaid.sk).

²² "CETIR: Center for Experience Transfer in Integration and Reform, Program of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic for transfer of experience in integration and reforms," Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 2013. Available online: [http://www.mzv.sk/App/WCM/ZU/BehradZU/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_3153A9E72D90EC21C1257B2500430592_EN/\\$File/CETIR_info.pdf](http://www.mzv.sk/App/WCM/ZU/BehradZU/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_3153A9E72D90EC21C1257B2500430592_EN/$File/CETIR_info.pdf) (accessed September 18, 2015).

²³ See "Center for Experience Transfer in Integration and Reform, (CETIR)," *op. cit*

²⁴ "Joint statement on the enhanced Visegrad Group activities in the Eastern Partnership. V4 prime ministers' summit, 2011," [visegradgroup.eu](http://www.visegradgroup.eu), June 16, 2011. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/joint-statement-on-the> (accessed on September 18, 2015).

Visegrad Group. It can also further the goals of the Eastern Partnership initiative – especially with regards to building a stronger, more open civil society in EaP countries. The Fund also advocates the importance of strengthening internal cohesion through mutual cooperation and the sharing of experience. This principle appears in the V4EaP program too, but besides the goal of internal cohesion within the groups, the creation of stronger ties between the V4 and EaP regions is also among the desired goals. An additional advantage of the IVF program is that it requires EaP NGOs to work with multiple V4 NGOs on supported projects, and therefore the added value is higher than in the case of the project support schemes of individual V4 countries.

On the other hand, providing project support through a common channel also means that regional cooperation gets additional visibility in the EaP region (instead of just an individual country). This might not be attractive for some emerging donors, while they are still in the process of establishing themselves and want to increase their own visibility through bilateral ODA, as opposed to funding new multilateral cooperation. Despite the obvious advantages, therefore, gaining more support and resources for such multilateral programs can pose a challenge. All in all, however, whether or not V4 countries will be willing to invest more into the V4EaP program still remains to be seen, and will depend both on the success of the program and on whether the common understanding prevails, that the EaP is the primary common foreign policy priority of regional cooperation.

Potential for enhancing IDC cooperation towards the EaP region

Since the international development cooperation systems of the Visegrad countries are all rather new – in most cases only about a decade old – they are still undergoing reforms, and the countries still striving to strengthen their own profiles as development donors in the world, by gradually increasing their bilateral ODA. With this in mind, it is highly unlikely that in the near future it would be in the interest of V4 countries to set up a common development fund – either for the EaP region or more generally. The political will and financial resources needed for such a common initiative are missing at the present stage.

Instead of creating new institutions, however, what is feasible and what should be considered is a rationalization of the current cooperation systems, and a consolidation of existing resources. As the previous section has shown, the Visegrad countries are all involved to various extents in the Eastern Partnership region through their IDC policies. Given that there are similarities between these policies, one can find overlaps; and given that there are differences, complementarities. There is indeed, therefore, a rationale for cooperating and coordinating better in order to improve the development presence of Visegrad countries in the EaP region.

The best entry points for such cooperation and coordination would be Ukraine and Moldova. All four Visegrad countries already have a significant presence in these two partner countries – relative to their size, of course. Contrariwise, their IDC presence is virtually non-existent in Armenia and Azerbaijan; Hungary and Slovakia are hardly visible in Georgia; and Belarus, the most challenging of all partners, is Poland's exclusive “playground” when it comes to development cooperation. Hence, initiating stronger cooperation where conditions are already ripe is only logical.

In Ukraine and Moldova, all Visegrad countries provide assistance both for the central and local administration, and for civil society. The following table lists the main focal points of

V4 development activities as outlined in each country's current multi-annual development strategy. In the case of Hungary, the list relies on the annual development reports of its foreign ministry for 2009 and 2010, as there is no strategy document available.

Table 1. Focus of V4 countries in Ukraine and Moldova

	Ukraine	Moldova
Poland (2012–2015)	Public security and border management; regional development; strengthening public administration and local government; SMEs and job creation	Public security and border management; regional development; strengthening public administration and local government; agriculture and rural development
Czech Republic (2010–2017)	Through its Transition Promotion Program: supporting civil society, youth, media, and human rights defenders; cooperation with local authorities	Environment; social development (education, social and health services); agriculture; water supply and sanitation; government and civil society Through its Transition Promotion Program: supporting civil society, youth, media, and human rights defenders; cooperation with local authorities
Hungary (based on annual reports, 2009–2010)	Strengthening public administration and local government; adoption of European standards (economy); public security and border management; strengthening civil society in Transcarpathia	Strengthening public administration and civil society (Dniester Euroregion); adoption of European standards (customs, phytosanitary standards)
Slovakia (2009–2013)	Building democratic institutions and civil society; market economy and infrastructure; social development	Building democratic institutions and civil society; market economy and infrastructure; social development

Strengthening public administration, institution building, and supporting the adoption of European standards (explicitly or implicitly – e.g. through customs, agriculture reform) are all present in each program. A review of the official documents shows that the modality of aid in such categories is usually technical assistance, managed through the central administration of the donor country and targeting governmental bodies in the recipient country. Nevertheless, apart from the Czech country-strategy for Moldova, none of the strategy documents refers to the importance of international donor coordination.²⁵ While there is no doubt that Moldova and Ukraine may benefit from all the technical assistance projects currently underway, stronger coordination should be considered among Visegrad partners. The benefit of such coordination, from the Visegrad perspective, would be the potential to cut costs by pooling resources, and to transfer more knowledge by pooling experience. From the recipients' point of view, the benefit is that they would get more concentrated support with higher added value.

²⁵ "Development cooperation programme: Moldova 2011–2017," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2011, pp. 11–3. Available online: http://www.mzv.cz/file/698495/Development_Cooperation_Programme_Moldova_2011_2017.pdf (accessed on September 18, 2015). The Slovak development strategy emphasizes the potential role of trilateral donor cooperation in the Eastern Partnership region, although for different reasons. Trilateral development cooperation is considered an advantageous form of providing assistance given the country's limited resources and new donor status. "Trilateral development assistance," Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, July, 29, 2013. Available online: http://www.foreign.gov.sk/en/foreign_policy/slovak_aid#trilateraldevelopmentassistance (accessed on September 18, 2015).

Currently, the institutional requirements for such coordination are not present, as there are no consultation procedures in place among Visegrad countries in this regard. However, since these projects are generally launched by central administration agencies, the ministries responsible for the areas in which support is provided should consult one another to find potential synergies among the four donors. If forward-looking strategic planning were in place, and each country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with the implementing agencies, oversaw the whole process (which anyway should be the long-term goal), then the MFAs' relevant departments could coordinate such consultations between each other.

Updating and extending the European Transition Compendium (ETC) with current data could lay the groundwork for such coordination. The ETC is a database created by the European Commission in cooperation with new member states, in order to collect information about their so-called transition experience and thus help with its incorporation into the European development cooperation policy.²⁶ While this database certainly has some significant shortcomings (outdated contacts, superficial information), its original idea is very constructive. Moreover, the database is accessible to anyone online, and can be kept up-to-date by the authorities of EU member states. Therefore, the infrastructure already exists to create a more meaningful and useful tool, both for internal coordination between Visegrad countries and for informing the partners about a given donor's areas of expertise.

Even though the Visegrad Cooperation began with the goal of strengthening internal cohesion, in recent years it has embarked on the path of developing its external dimension as well. While the Eastern Partnership as such has been high on the agenda of Visegrad Presidencies in past years, international development cooperation – which could be a tool for supporting the goals of the EaP – still has only limited visibility within presidential programs.

A common aspect of the V4's development activities in Moldova and Ukraine is the support provided for the development of civil society, which is a crucial element of democratization. Without a strong civil sector endorsing European values and standards, democracy's sustainability will be endangered in Ukraine and Moldova. Without detailed data, however, it is hard to say exactly how much is invested into such activities (e.g. civil society support, scholarships) by each Visegrad country. Nevertheless, it would be advisable to concentrate sufficient resources in these fields, as they have significant socialization and multiplier effects.

Continuing with the scholarship schemes, with their strong socialization potential, is also an essential investment. Currently, Poland operates a successful scholarship scheme that is highly popular in Ukraine, but considerably less so in Moldova. This can be explained, of course, by the language factor and geographical proximity. Hungary also provides scholarships both in Ukraine and Moldova, but the outreach is very limited. Therefore, Visegrad countries should provide further possibilities for students coming from both countries to study at V4 colleges and universities, by providing access to education in English, or potentially in the host country's language after intensive language training.

On-the-ground projects strengthening civil society are implemented through various organizations. In Poland, it's the International Solidarity Fund, in the Czech Republic the Transition Promotion Program as part of the MFA, in Slovakia the Slovak Development Agency, while in Hungary the MFA coordinates such projects. With such a diverse institutional

²⁶ The European Transition Compendium is available online at: www.eutransition.eu (accessed on September 18, 2015).

background, and with the responsible institutions having such varying levels of authority, coordinating these programs and projects between Visegrad countries is more problematic than is the case with technical assistance. Therefore, two alternative paths might be considered: align the frameworks of direct project support in the different countries to allow for Visegrad NGOs to cooperate when applying for the calls of individual MFAs or agencies; or, while retaining the current channels, strengthen the IVF's V4EaP program after the first round of projects will have been evaluated.

The main advantage of building on the IVF is that the institutional framework is already in place, with a proven record of being able to manage international projects. While this would not increase the bilateral share of the Visegrad countries' ODA and might not raise the profile of an individual country, the IVF's practice of funding mutual projects involving multiple Visegrad and EaP partners provides better opportunities for participating organizations to exchange their experience and good practices within a wider group, allowing for more diverse input. Engaging with several organizations at once opens more channels to different networks for the project's participants. Such an outcome contributes significantly to the goal of the EaP program, by both broadening and deepening people-to-people contacts between EU member states and Eastern partner countries.

Recommendations

- Visegrad countries should maintain political support for the Eastern Partnership program at the European level and advocate for an increase of funds.
- The V4 should move further beyond political declarations and should enhance the effectiveness of its international development cooperation policies directed towards EaP countries through coordination and cooperation.
- While the rhetoric is that of clear support, based on their IDC figures the Visegrad countries should engage more resources to contribute to the success of the Eastern Partnership program.
- Setting up a new, common Visegrad Development Fund for such purposes is not realistic at the moment. Instead, the V4 should focus on the better use of existing instruments.
- At first, the Visegrad countries should narrow the scope of their enhanced coordination to the two most advanced partner countries: Ukraine and Moldova.
- Visegrad countries should start strategic consultations for the purpose of creating coordination procedures between institutions responsible for the strategic planning of IDC and the management of technical assistance programs.
- Making use of already existing tools is pivotal. The online version of the European Transition Compendium should be updated to define those areas in which V4 countries have valuable transition experience, and this information should be shared between each other and with partners.
- Through coordination and the use of updated tools, V4 countries and their EaP partners should find new synergies for cooperation.
- Pooling financial and knowledge-based resources for specific, commonly identified technical assistance programs and projects could be a step forward.
- And finally, increasing support for civil society through scholarships and further project funding opportunities at the International Visegrad Fund should be considered, in order to further people-to-people contacts and enhance the socialization effects of such programs.

Annex I. – Official development assistance of the Visegrad countries

Million USD Constant prices, 2011	Czech Republic				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GNI*	190984,24	197159,91	188888,87	192536,2	200934,29
ODA*	209,5	244,86	225,77	243,79	250,46
Bilateral ODA*	94,81	115,1	106,23	85,02	79,96
Multilateral ODA*	114,69	129,76	119,54	158,77	170,5
ODA/GNI	0,11%	0,12%	0,12%	0,13%	0,12%
Bilateral ODA/GNI	0,05%	0,06%	0,06%	0,04%	0,04%
Multilateral ODA/GNI	0,06%	0,07%	0,06%	0,08%	0,08%
Bilateral ODA/ODA	45%	47%	47%	35%	32%
Multilateral ODA/ODA	55%	53%	53%	65%	68%

Million USD Constant prices, 2011	Hungary				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GNI*	141354,81	136097,87	130065,23	132059,42	129699,89
ODA*	108,92	102,27	123,86	121,92	139,73
Bilateral ODA*	34,77	14,77	31,36	30,24	33,15
Multilateral ODA*	74,15	87,5	92,5	91,68	106,58
ODA/GNI	0,08%	0,08%	0,10%	0,09%	0,11%
Bilateral ODA/GNI	0,02%	0,01%	0,02%	0,02%	0,03%
Multilateral ODA/GNI	0,05%	0,06%	0,07%	0,07%	0,08%
Bilateral ODA/ODA	32%	14%	25%	25%	24%
Multilateral ODA/ODA	68%	86%	75%	75%	76%

Million USD Constant prices, 2011	Poland				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GNI*	373234,91	441466,44	460357,74	474241,03	495985,96
ODA*	378,51	332,64	411,55	396,02	416,91
Bilateral ODA*	162,47	74,86	100,86	100,68	90,12
Multilateral ODA*	216,04	257,78	310,69	295,34	326,79
ODA/GNI	0,10%	0,08%	0,09%	0,08%	0,08%
Bilateral ODA/GNI	0,04%	0,02%	0,02%	0,02%	0,02%
Multilateral ODA/GNI	0,06%	0,06%	0,07%	0,06%	0,07%
Bilateral ODA/ODA	43%	23%	25%	25%	22%
Multilateral ODA/ODA	57%	77%	75%	75%	78%

Million USD Constant prices, 2011	Slovakia				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GNI*	85451,23	92666,12	88868	92057,21	94205,82
ODA*	79,51	92,73	76,9	78,65	86,02
Bilateral ODA*	32,64	41,21	20,22	21,28	21,43
Multilateral ODA*	46,87	51,52	56,68	57,37	64,59
ODA/GNI	0,09%	0,10%	0,09%	0,09%	0,09%
Bilateral ODA/GNI	0,04%	0,04%	0,02%	0,02%	0,02%
Multilateral ODA/GNI	0,05%	0,06%	0,06%	0,06%	0,07%
Bilateral ODA/ODA	41%	44%	26%	27%	25%
Multilateral ODA/ODA	59%	56%	74%	73%	75%

* Source of data: OECD

Annex II. – Official Development Assistance of the Visegrad Countries in the Eastern Partnership Countries

Million USD Constant prices, 2011		Czech Republic				
		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GNI*		190984,24	197159,91	188888,87	192536,2	200934,29
Bilateral ODA*		94,81	115,1	106,23	85,02	79,96
Bilateral ODA in	Armenia**	0,5	0,67	0,43	0,73	0,21
	Azerbaijan**	0,07	0,04	0,07	0,12	0,05
	Belarus**	1,7	1,67	1,58	1,77	1,78
	Georgia**	1	2,32	5,86	4,17	2,05
	Moldova**	2,82	2,88	3,26	4,25	4,28
	Ukraine**	2,69	3,14	5,29	3,22	3,03
	Eastern Partnership	8,78	10,72	16,49	14,26	11,4
Bilateral ODA in EaP/Bilateral ODA		9,26%	9,31%	15,52%	16,77%	14,26%
Bilateral ODA in EaP/GNI		0,005%	0,005%	0,009%	0,007%	0,006%

Million USD Constant prices, 2011		Hungary				
		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GNI*		141354,81	136097,87	130065,23	132059,42	129699,89
Bilateral ODA*		34,77	14,77	31,36	30,24	33,15
Bilateral ODA in	Armenia**	0	0	0	0,02	0,06
	Azerbaijan**	0	0,03	0,03	0,05	0,1
	Belarus**	0	0,08	0,01	0,05	0,16
	Georgia**	0	0,26	0,05	0,03	0,13
	Moldova**	0,27	0,42	0,17	0,23	0,1
	Ukraine**	2,49	2,25	1,92	4,12	3,62
	Eastern Partnership	2,76	3,04	2,18	4,5	4,17
Bilateral ODA in EaP/Bilateral ODA		7,94%	20,58%	6,95%	14,88%	12,58%
Bilateral ODA in EaP/GNI		0,002%	0,002%	0,002%	0,003%	0,003%

Million USD Constant prices, 2011		Poland				
		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GNI*		373234,91	441466,44	460357,74	474241,03	495985,96
Bilateral ODA*		162,47	74,86	100,86	100,68	90,12
Bilateral ODA in	Armenia**	0,22	0,45	0,56	0,59	1,12
	Azerbaijan**	0,49	0,29	0,24	0,19	0,4
	Belarus**	15,57	16,36	17,03	15,82	21,21
	Georgia**	1,62	2,57	12,29	6,49	6,58
	Moldova**	1,84	2,06	1,16	1,2	1,71
	Ukraine**	13,12	12,46	10,02	11,53	12,04
	Eastern Partnership**	32,86	34,19	41,3	35,82	43,06
Bilateral ODA in EaP/Bilateral ODA		20,23%	45,67%	40,95%	35,58%	47,78%
Bilateral ODA in EaP/GNI		0,009%	0,008%	0,009%	0,008%	0,009%

Million USD Constant prices, 2011	Slovakia					
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	
GNI*	85451,23	92666,12	88868	92057,21	94205,82	
Bilateral ODA*	32,64	41,21	20,22	21,28	21,43	
Bilateral ODA in	Armenia**	0	0	0	0	
	Azerbaijan**	0	0	0,02	0	
	Belarus**	0,08	0,2	0,03	0,17	0,05
	Georgia**	0	0,12	0,09	0,51	0,51
	Moldova**	0,19	0,17	0,13	0,49	0,27
	Ukraine**	0,06	0,48	1,02	0,35	0,49
	Eastern Partnership**	0,33	0,97	1,29	1,52	1,32
Bilateral ODA in EaP/Bilateral ODA	1,01%	2,35%	6,38%	7,14%	6,16%	
Bilateral ODA in EaP/GNI	0,000%	0,001%	0,001%	0,002%	0,001%	

* Source of data: OECD; ** Source of data: AidFlows.org

Annex III. – Aggregated Visegrad Official Development Aid Data

V4 ODA	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Czech Republic*	209,5	244,86	225,77	243,79	250,46
Hungary*	108,92	102,27	123,86	121,92	139,73
Poland*	378,51	332,64	411,55	396,02	416,91
Slovakia*	79,51	92,73	76,9	78,65	86,02
TOTAL*	776,44	772,5	838,08	840,38	893,12

V4 Bilateral ODA	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Czech Republic*	94,81	115,1	106,23	85,02	79,96
Hungary*	34,77	14,77	31,36	30,24	33,15
Poland*	162,47	74,86	100,86	100,68	90,12
Slovakia*	32,64	41,21	20,22	21,28	21,43
TOTAL*	324,69	245,94	258,67	237,22	224,66

V4 Bilateral ODA in EaP	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Czech Republic**	8,78	10,72	16,49	14,26	11,4
Hungary**	2,76	3,04	2,18	4,5	4,17
Poland**	32,86	34,19	41,3	35,82	43,06
Slovakia**	0,33	0,97	1,29	1,52	1,32
TOTAL*	44,73	48,92	61,26	56,1	59,95

V4 Total	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
ODA*	776,44	772,5	838,08	840,38	893,12
Bilateral ODA*	324,69	245,94	258,67	237,22	224,66
Bilat. ODA in EaP**	44,73	48,92	61,26	56,1	59,95
ODA in EaP/ODA	5,76%	6,33%	7,31%	6,68%	6,71%
ODA in EaP/Bilat.ODA	13,78%	19,89%	23,68%	23,65%	26,68%

All data is in Million USD, constant prices, 2011

*Source of data: OECD

** Based on OECD data from AidFlows.org